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"POLICY" IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS
A lecture delivered by
Dr. Henry M. Wristonat the Naval War College
May 23, 1950
Occasionally it is desirable to take the mind off the instant
oblem
· in order. to consider broader and more general questions;
pr
the current puzzle is sometimes easier to solve after it is looked at
in a longer perspective.

When this is done successfully it changes
the scale of daily events and makes it possible to view them with
more detachment and see them in their relationship to values which
are permanent.

In an attempt to do something of that kind I wish to discuss

what we really mean by "policy" in foreign affairs.
we are faced with a problem in semantics.

At the outset

The language of

diplomacy, at least until the Russians revised international manners,
has been formal in style and notable for understatement.

It is not

infrequently equivocal in expression. The reason. is simple: anyone

executing diplomatic maneuvers must have in mind the possibility

of failure and must prepare in advance a way of retreat in order to
save face; if prestige is maintained, it is possible to return to the

encounter when arguments have been refurbished, military and

other dispositions re-arranged, and when the chances of success are

· more favorable.

In dealing with

basic

policy, however, "diplomatic" language

should never be used. Meaning should be crystal clear; therefore,

policy is best expressed in naked terms. An illustration from domes
tic life will clarify the point.

When nullification threatened the
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Union, President Jackson reduced fundamental policy to a brief
phrase in his classic toast: "The Federal Union:. it must be pre
served.'' That was a definition of the problem in terms so clear, so
explicit, and so simple that it was impossible to· confuse the issue.
When adjustment, which had been tried earlier in the Mis
souri Compromise and was tried again in 1850, failed to resolve the
conflict and the States were brought to the verge of war, Lincoln re
stated the Jacksonian policy in language equally clear and perhaps
even more explicit. In a letter to Horace Greeley he wrote: "If I
could save the Union withoutJreeing any slaves, I would do it; and
if I could do it by freeing all the slaves!, I would do it; and if I could
save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also
do that."
He succeeded, in those few words, in separating the central
issue-the preservation of the Union__:from the confusing emotional
tensions arising frotn the problem of slavery. . In the Second In
augural he again re-stated the issue with such matchless clarity that
Charles Francis Adams, Jr., wrote his father, our Minister in Lon
don: "That rail-splitting lawyer is one of the wonders of the day ....
This inaugural strikes me in the grand simplicity and directness as
being for all time the historical keynote of this war."
It is one of the major tragedies of our time that no such lucid
summary of the meaning of the recent world war has come from
any statesman. It is a measure of our confusion that it is asserted
from time to time that no such valid and clear pronouncement could
be made because of the incoherence which the Russian alliance·
brought in its train. This is not true. If one has any grasp of
historical fact, it must be clear that the Russian -alliance brought no
more complications than the slavery issue brought to the War be
tween the States. Lincoln was able to put in words which a child
2
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could understand the reason for war. In similar fashion the basic
policy beneath American participation in both world wars of the
20th century is just as simple; any schoolboy could grasp it. It is,
explicitly, that the interests of the United States are so world-wide
that it could n0t permit any aggressor nation to control the whole
continent of Europe-or for that matter Asia.
That is the complete and adequate explanation of our par
ticipation in both wars. It is also the complete and adequate explanation of our delay in entering both wars. Our basic interest is
real and vital, but it is neither so immediate nor so vital as the like
interests of Britain and France. As long as there was reasonable
basis for the belief that Britain and France could win alone, or with
moral and material help from us, or assistance short of force, there
was adequate reason to al;>stain from fighting: When it became
clear that the risk of their defeat was too great and, therefore,
our own policy was genuinely imperiled, we went in. It is not nec
essary to assert that the timing was accurate in either case. The
point is that delay in participation was� not irrational. As funda
mental policy explains our entrance into the world wars, it equally
explains our part in the "cold war"; the fact that victory in two
world wars did not avoid the cold war does not invalidate the
reasoning.
When one looks at foreign policies, therefore, there are
many which can be put in phrases just as clear and just as brief·
as the Jacksonian policy with reference to the Federal Union. The
classical British doctrine, the Balance of Power, illustrates the
point. Our twin policies of the Open Door in China and the in
tegrity of China are other illustrations. If one reflects upon those
fundamentals with which we are concerned this morning, it will be
perfectly obvious that they can be more effectively implemented
and more successfully carried out when they are reduced to plain,
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naval war with France and the War of 1812 with Britain. But it
could not emerge as a very significant policy until all the world

recognized us as a. world power, and it could not become a funda
mental policy until we were recognized as the Western power
the anchor man in that power group.

We have the- same sort of fundamental policy with regard

to Asia.

Of course, we had no basic Asiatic policy for many years

because we did not face the Pacific and Asia was not a factor in
world affairs., But once we touched the Pacific it is extraordinary

how speedily men who have no claims to great statesmanship per
ceived the reality of our interest in that continent. Thus as Asia

came into the focus · of international aff'airs and as we rose to the

stature of a world power, the policy of no single dominant power

in Europe had to be matched by a policy of no dominant power in

Asia.

It found expression in two classical phrases-the Open Door

in China, that is resistance to economic imperialism, and the In
tegrity of China, or resistance to political imperialism.

It is essential to recognize the extraordinary stability of

basic policy.

The ebb and flow of circumstances over those un

derlying realities must occasion many tactical maneuvers in the
effort to make policy effective, but that does not mean a new policy.
The Integrity of China, for example, is still valid.
many vicissitudes.

It has suffered

As a policy it was never fully achieved; but, if

one understands its fundamental character and appreciates how long
it was in maturing, it becomes · equally clear that it is not yet com

pletely, or permanently, defeated. Its current eclipse is nothing to
be happy about, but neither is it anything to despair over.
Thus when we draw policy into its time perspective it be

comes clear that most so-called "new'' policies are transient; that
is because they violate a third quality which
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Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1950

a

fundamental policy

5
5

Naval War College Review, Vol. 3 [1950], No. 7, Art. 2

RESTRICTED
should have.

It should be not only clear and stable, but free of

passion and emotion; it ought to be a strictly intellectual construct
framed from real and permanent interests and utterly devoid of

heat.

Of course, once it has come to definition and its status is

determined it may be, in fact it must be, defended with fervor. But

what Jackson showed in his toast and Lincoln demonstrated in the

War between the states, Washington had defined in his Farewell

Address; he emphasized the objectivity of proper policy when he .

spoke

against

tipathies."

"passionate

attachments"

and

"inveterate

an

Thus the so-:ealled "Morgenthau policy" for Germany was,

it seems to me, not a policy at all; it was just a reaction under ·

emotional stress; it overlooked geography, mcperience, tlie talents

of a people, strategical concepts, and the psychology of both Ger
mans and Americans. It was, therefore, transient.

It was also disastrous, because it exemplified a characteris

tic modern error-.:the belief that the opposite of som�thing bad

must be somethng good, which is not true.

By destroying not only

__

German dominance but German power completely, protection is not

achieved; it may lead, as the Morgenthau proposal did, to a power

vacuum and thus draw in another nation (in this instance Russia)

until it tl}reatens to replace the beaten nation as the dominant force
in Europe.

The consequence may be a situation no less intolerable

than that which was overcome by war.

The policy of destroying all German power-economic, pol

itical, and military-was emotionally oriented.

The war checked

Fascis� and Nazism, but the exhaustion of .the West offered to

Russia an opportunity to attempt something which was contrary

to our interest. Only slowly did realization dawn that an emotional
response was likely to defeat our own policy by making us think
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of Germany in negative terms only and misconceive Russia in posi
tive terms, often sentimentally. This attitude can be summed up
in the phrase, "Good old Joe," now happily relegated to the realm
of myth.
In the fourth place we should remember that the word
"policy" should be reserved for the things which are fundamental
and continuous and should not be applied to devices and tactics,
however important they may be. - It is a mistake, for example, to
refer to the Marshall Plan as basic policy. It is an extraordinary
important operation, but nonetheless essentially a tactical device
in support of our basic policy of preventing a single aggressive power
from encompassing Europe. It is, therefore, a means to a larger
end. It is, as we know, a transient means, for, by its own terms,
it is to end in 1952. It has all the elements of ingeniousness that
any brilliant tactical maneuver should have; it involves the con
structive use of economic power to buy time for the re-creation and
re-organization of forces likely to hold Russia in check. Its success
or failure must be judged upon those considerations.
It certainly has bought time. I do not think anyone seri
ously believes that the Italian Government would be constituted
as it is today without the Marshall Plan or that the Greek Govern
ment would be constituted as it is today but for Marshall aid. There
is now before us a novel and bold suggestion-the Schuman pro
posal for the integration of the coal and steel industries of France
and Germany. That proposal would have been incredible if either
DeGaulle or the Communists had been in contro.l of France. If the
Third Force had not been perpetuated in power by external support,
that dramatic program for strengthening the economic defenses of
Western Europe would never have been proposed.
Whether progress toward the re-organization of Europe is
complete enough or swift enough is a matter of judgment. Current
RESTRICTED
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spicuous by its absence in China. We, therefore, had no channel
through which our policy could flow. General Wedmeyer also came
to that conclusion and said, in effect, that

if we

wanted to be sure

to stop the Reds we must supply the personnel and make the full
commitments; otherwise we must let nature take its course for a
time because he saw no hope of making an effective instrument of
Chiang Kai-shek.

Somewhat the same problem has confronted us in Greece;

we have had to work with what is there. The letter, which Am
bassador Grady wrote to the Premier of Greece on the first of

April, makes it clear that what we have had to work with in that
country is. not very good; he made a bold and tactically dangerous
move to. improve it. This is what he said: "The effort to make

Greece self-sustaining and independent of foreign aid .... has
hardly begun ....An important reason for the · delay has been a
r
less than satisfactoy performance by the Greek Government in its
conduct of economic affairs.Only twenty-seven months remain in

which the Greek Government may take advantage of the American
aid made available through the Marshall Plan. This short time
permits no further delay ....The American people, however, are

entitled to expect, and do expect, that any Greek Government
which hopes to continue to receive the aid which they have gen
erously offered, will utilize this assistance to the fullest degree.
"In my opinion, only a stable and efficient Government SUP
ported by the people and by Parliament will be able to act with

courage and the firmness of long-term policy which are essential

to the wise use of the aid offered by the American people. Irre

sponsible talk of adjourning Parliament or of new elections before
th.e new Parliament has had an opportunity to rise to its responsi

bility, can only create a climate of political and economic uncer

tainty which may do grave damage to the country's future ....
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Only a Government which can secure and . maintain public confi

dence by its boldness and by its devotion to the public interest can

be expected to execute the reconstruction stage of Greek recovery.

We earnestly hope the Greek Government will meet this challenge

. . . . It is in the hands of the Greek Government and the Greek

Parliament to decide whether or not they wish to continue to re

ceive American aid and hence to accept the responsibilities which
will attain its purpose.

It is .the obligation and intention of the

American Government with regard to all Marshall aid countries to

decide whether or not the performance of the recipient Govern
ment, whether Greek or any/ other, justifies a continuance of the
aid on the scale heretofore contemplated."

When one has read the letter and realizes that it is usually

bad tactics to interfere so openly in · the domestic politics of a·
foreign nation, both the boldness and the dangerousnes,s of the
mo've become clear.

It suggests the situation was so serious that

only a drastic remedy was worth trying. It also highlights how a

sound· and necessary policy may fail temporarily ( and the word ·
"temporarily" must sometimes be given a very flexible interpre

,,

tation) for want of adequate, cooperating partners.

11

11

The sixth aspect of basic policy in this review is that suc

cess or failure at any given moment is affected by the quality of

our own management. Americans in times past were proud of our
"shirt-sleeves diplomacy," which in some circumstances was well
adapted and worked satisfactorily, and in other circumstances was
hopelessly bad.

There have been at times amazing deftness and

finesse, great perception and skill, and at other times, stupidity

and lack of stamina.

As a sound strategic concept can fail for want of energy

ari.d for many other reasons, so a policy which is entirely valid
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can be under-played, as the Monroe Doctrine was from time to time
when we were not alert enough in the defense of its principles;
it can be over-played, also, as Olney did in the Venezuela case.
Neither the under-playing nor the over-playing affects the valid
ity of the basic concept. The Monroe Doctrine does not represent
a geographic reality, for the Western Hemisphere, except physi
cally, is pretty much a myth. Certainly it is not culturally valid.
Nonetheless politically it is sound, and even the failure of Latin
America to develop along the democratic lines that the Anglo
Saxons believe are correct, while it causes difficulties, does not
make the fundamental concept less valid. It must be said that so
far as the Monroe Doctrine is concerned our successive Secretaries
of State, since we became a world power, have adapted themselves
to the changing scene.
In the seventh place, success of a basic policy does not hang
upon dramatic or critical events. We have practically worn out
the word "crisis" in our time. Modern means of communication
and other factors have led us to over-dramatize the daily event
and to hide the fact that indirect results are often more important
than the immediate result. As George F. Kennan suggested recent
ly in his notable speech in Milwaukee, sometimes five or ten years
elapse between cause and effect in major foreign policy develop
ments. The true meaning emerges only after the sense of crisis
has subsided.
Hitler offers a dramatic example: he told his men that on
their arms rested "the fate of the German nation for the next
thousand years." That was nonsense, because it made transient
circumstances appear too decisive over too long a period. Already
we can see that the German nation, though defeated, is now so
essential to both competing power blocs that we may again see a
repetition of what has happened so often before in history: over
RESTRICTED
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a considerable period of time the defeated nation may profit more
in defeat than it would have profited if it had won the victory.
Hitler's error suggests a common failing. Right now over
dramatization of current events leads us to expect too much of
diplomatic conferences. It.is complained, for example, that the Big
Three communique issued week before last sounded very much like . ·
the one issued nearly a year before. That ought not to be re
garded as necessarily bad. It may well reflect steadiness of pur�
pose, not a mere rushing from one hunch to another.
/

In 1880 one of our basic policies was crystallized by President Hayes, when he said that, "The policy of this country is a
canal under American control .. . . An inter-oceanic canal across
·the American Isthmus will essentially change the geographical re
lations between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United
States ....It would be the great ocean thoroughfare between our·
....shores, and virtually a part of the coast line of the United
States."
The last phrase sums it UP-the canal as "part of the
coast line of the United States." That was as explicit as a policy
could be made. Few people could now tell with any precision why
· that statement came just when ,it did; the crisis which precipitated
the pronouncement has faded. The policy, so plainly and forcefully
stated, remains. It ran counter to the terms of the Clayton.
Bulwer treaty and Hayes' comment was in a sense an announcement.
of the fact and a prediction that the treaty would not survi.ve. the
pursuit of American policy.
Over the years that policy could have been implemeJJted by
any number of actions. At one extreme would have been the an
nexation of everything within that "coast line." There was a

12
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strong drift in that direction for some time. The statement of
Olney that our "fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines
its interposition" was in harmony with such an idea. The Platt
Amendment. for Cuba and tlre putting of armed forces into Haiti,
Santo Domtngo, Nicaragua, and other countries might have
eventuated in military, political, and economic control. At the
other extreme, while the basic policy of regarding the canal as

part .of our coast line remains unchanged, · all our relations with
Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean have been.put upon the
bases of mutuality, with some_ accent upon United States leader
ship, to a degree which Olney's tactics would never have led one
to expect as within the realm of possibility. In short, a shift in
tactics from time to time seen in too short a perspective looks like
a shift in policy, when in reality it does not involve 1:Juch a de
velopment.

This consideration leads to the eighth point. · One of the
central i1:Jsues of recent discussion is bipartisanism. Basic policies
are non-political. That is more accurate than saying bi-partisan. I
think Senator· Vandenberg recently called- them "un-partisan,"
which correctly expresses the point. The Monroe Doctrine, the
Panama Canal as our coast line, Canada as within our defense
system resistance to. control of Europe or Asia by a single power
all these policies would be the same whether the administration were
Republican or Democratic.
On the other hand, the tactical dispositions adopted to

achieve the policies are subject to politics, and properly so.

It is

the essence of the democratic system that action by the party in
power is carried on under the scrutiny and criticism of the.minority.

In England this -is epitomized by the phrase, "His Majesty's loyal

opposition." It is revealed in our government by the fraternaliza
tion across the aisle at one moment and the tension· between the
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two sides at the next.

The opposition almost always has to take

a somewhat negative attitude because it does not have access to all

the current dispatches and information necessary for constructive
judgment.

But even when criticis� is negative, it may well force

those in power to act carefully.

It can be vigorous and occasionally

may be violent, but should be at all costs responsible.

When we

see political opposition in this light, we realize that it is not to be
deprecated, but encouraged; that is the only way in a democratic

society by which the public can hear both sides of every question

and reach a considered consensus.

In times of crisis when there is imminent and serious

danger, opposition is mitigated.

That has been true of the so

called "Truman Doctrine" with regard to Greece and Turkey, true in

connection with the Berlin air lift and the Marshall Plan. Nonthe
less, if the mitigation of opposition is long continued and not

limited to matters under dangerous tension, it leads to a tendency
to regard all opposition as improper.

That feeling is far more

dangerous in many respects than even violent opposition because

it cuts at the root of the responsibility of the majority party and

- destroys the foundations for an informed public opinion.

Consideration of policy in these broader terms indicates in

the ninth place that it must be judged dynamically, rather than by

any static method of estimation.

One recent proposal is that we

draw up a balance sheet to show our assets and liabilities and learn
whether or not we are over-extended.

It is not ari apt analogy,

because policy is never fully reflected in a balance sheet-even
industrial policy.

By its nature the momentum, which is inherent

in the activity of -any organization, is not shown.

In some of our

greatest corporations, the balance sheet has an item: patents, one

dollar. If the patents were really worth one dollar, the organization
would be bankrupt.

If the company did not have the patents, it

14
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would not be in business.

That dollar is merely a symbolic figure;

it is an indication that the value of the patents cannot be esti
mated.

Anyone who has been on an investment committee knows

that the balance sheet does not adequately reflect the kind of man
agement the company has.

The enterprise may be solvent, but

stagnant; management may be vital, but unwise.

Those consid

erations could well be concealed, rather than revealed, on a balance

sheet.

Moreover, the balance sheet, by its very nature, isolates

. the company. It does not show it in relationship to its competitors
or to those cooperating with it.

But an industrial company does

not live in isolation any more than a nation does. Therefore, while

a balance sheet has certain obvious merits, as a basis for estimation
of policy it may be quite misleading.

Let us take, for example, the Monroe Doctrine; on any bal

ance-sheet theory it would never have been drafted by so stern a

realist as John Quincy Adams nor uttered by so seasoned a political
leader as James Monroe.

There were timorous people who felt at

the time that we were over-extending our commitments.

They

wanted us at least to concert our action with Britain; but John

Quincy Adams, one of our really great Secretaries of State, said that

he was unwilling the United States should come in �s "a cockboat

in the wake of the British man-of-war." He could read with amuse

ment, not untinged with irritation, the bombastic words of George
Canning, "I called the New World into existence to redress the bal

ance of the Old," because he knew that statement was not true.

The policy involved in the Monroe Doctrine has been chal

lenged many times and by many powers-Britain, France, and
Germany among others-but we were seldom alone in its defense.
It is not historically accurate to say that it rested upon the power
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of the British navy. From time to time it did so depend to some
extent, but at other times it challenged the power of the British
navy.
What the balance-sheet technique would conceal is that, when
at various times the issue was drawn, there was almost always
some nation with an interest which was parallel to our own over a
short or middle-length period, and that we could count upon assist
ance, direct or indirect. It was not even necessary that our inter
ests should coincide with those of the cooperating power in Latin
America; support might mean no more than a common desire to op
pose the threatening power for wholly different reasons; the ef
fect was to lend help to our policy at the moment of crisis. But
even beyond such assistance there is a fact of first importance,
namely that we always had a greater interest in the preservation of
the Monroe Doctrine than anyone else could have in challenging it.
This leads to the final characteristic of basic policy: not all
policies, not even all basic policies, have the same order of magni
tude or equal priority. We would defend the policy of the Panama
Canal as part of our coast line before we would make war to avoid
dominance of Asia by a single power. Similarly, we mitigated our
support of the Monroe Doctrine in the course of the Civil War be
cause the indissolubility of the Union took priority over the main
tenance of the Monroe Doctrine. The balance-sheet technique con
ceals the fact that our commitments are not uniform over the
whole area of policy and, more particularly, that they are not uni
form at any given moment. Moreover, not all the policies of a nation
are challenged at the same moment. For this reason it is never
necessary to exert all the nation's power behind every policy at one
time ; they tend to be successively challenged-not all at once.
16
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Other nations, some of whose policies parallel our own, may
indeed
must have, different priorities. That no one power
have,
should dominate Europe is American policy; it is also British
policy and French policy. Inevitably it has a higher priority in the
British and French hierarchy of policy than in ours. The same
reasoning applies to aid to Greece and Turkey. Because they were
on her life-line, Britain's interest was more immediate and direct
than ours. Our interest in them was a subsidiary of our determina
tion to let no nation dominate Europe. Only when Britain notified
us that she could not bear the w�ight, and when the Russian threat
was immediate and serious, did we take over the leadership.
Today there is no direct threat to the Canal as part of our
coast line, no challenge to Canada as within our defense system, no
infringement of the Monroe Doctrine; today it is our policy of no
one dominant nation over all Europe or Asia that is being chal
lenged. That fact accounts for the notable shift in our tactical dis
positions, in new political emphases, and in dramatic economic man
euvers; but it does not in any way mean the abandonment of other
policies, nor does it mean that we are over-committed, because
while there is a very heavy threat in one area, there is virtual
absence of challenge in others.
The purpose of this review of the underlying considerations
in foreign policy is to lift our sights from the daily and immediate,
the complex and the confusing. It is designed to help us look at
the broader significance which time and analysis can reveal. The
seriousness of the current situation is abundantly clear. We do not
want even a tactical reverse. Nevertheless no one ever achieves all
his objectives; whether we like it or not we must expect some re
verses because our opponent is strong, resourceful, and determined.
The recent temper of Americans has been one of reacton from the
stimulation of victory; it may well have moved from the over-optimRESTRICTED
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1950

17
17

Naval War College Review, Vol. 3 [1950], No. 7, Art. 2

ism that followed triumph to an unwarranted pessimism. Judgment
will be sounder if is founded upon a long-range view.
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